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CAMPUR TANGAN TENTERA NIGERIA DI LIBERIA 1990-1997:  
SATU PENILAIAN REALIS 
ABSTRAK 
Negara Liberia terjerumus ke dalam kancah perang saudara antara tahun 1990 
hingga 1997.  Kerajaan Nigeria pada masa itu telah melancarkan dan mengetuai 
campur tangan ketenteraan dengan dominasi tentera Nigeria dalam cubaan 
menamatkan perang saudara tersebut. Campur tangan ketenteraan Nigeria ini, dari 
perspektif realis, dilakukan untuk mempertahan kepentingan nasionalnya dengan 
mengembalikan keamanan di Liberia melalui mekanisme yang dipersetujui secara 
multilateral.  Namun, hal ini tidak dibuktikan dalam penulisan sedia ada setakat ini. 
Oleh itu, satu kajian yang cuba mengisi lompang ilmu dalam penulisan sedia ada perlu 
dibuat.  Maka, objektif kajian ini adalah pertama untuk mengenal pasti sama ada 
penglibatan tentera Nigeria di Liberia memenuhi kepentingan nasional Nigeria; dan 
kedua, menentukan sama ada campur tangan yang dipimpin Nigeria ini merupakan 
inisiatif antarabangsa hasil muafakat multilateral yang patut dicontohi, atau satu 
duluan berbahaya dalam hubungan antarabangsa. Di samping data sekunder, kajian ini 
menggunakan maklumbalas daripada temubual mendalam dengan penggubal dan 
pelaksana dasar Nigeria semasa campur tangan ketenteraan tersebut. Teori realisme 
telah diaplikasi untuk menganalisis campur tangan ini. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa sepanjang tempoh kajian, campur tangan ketenteraan Nigeria di Liberia 
bukanlah untuk menjaga kepentingan nasional Nigeria dan juga bukan dipersetujui 
secara multilateral. Negara-bangsa disaran untuk lebih rasional dan berhati-hati dalam 
menggunakan mekanisme campur tangan ketenteraan di persada antarabangsa. Kajian 
lanjut dari perspektif teoritikal lain disyorkan juga dibuat bagi memenuhi jurang 
kelopongan pengetahuan dalam penulisan sedia ada.  
xv 
 
NIGERIA’S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERIA 1990-1997:  
A REALIST ASSESSMENT 
ABSTRACT 
The Liberian nation was plunged into civil war between 1990 and 1997. The 
Nigerian military government at the time, in its perceived attempt to stop the war, 
initiated and led a military intervention in the country predominantly using the 
Nigerian Army. In realist terms, Nigeria‘s military involvement was to defend her 
national interest by restoring peace to Liberia through a consensual multilateral 
mechanism. Indications from extant literature, so far, have not shown any convincing 
evidence of this expectation in the Nigerian involvement. This is a knowledge gap that 
needs to be filled. The objectives of this study, therefore, are first, to ascertain if the 
Nigerian military involvement in Liberia was in her national interest; and second, to 
clarify if the Nigerian-led intervention was a commendable, multilateral, consensual 
international initiative as assumed, or if it was a dangerous precedent in international 
relations. The study utilises oral responses from in-depth interviews with Nigerian 
policy makers and executors during the intervention, in conjunction with secondary 
data. The theory of realism is applied in analysing the Nigerian military involvement. 
The findings of the study are that first, the Nigerian military involvement in Liberia, 
in the period under study, was not in Nigeria‘s national interest; and second, it was not 
multilaterally consensual. The study suggests the need for rational and cautious use of 
the mechanism of military intervention by nation-states in their international 
behaviour; and recommends further research in the study area possibly from other 
theoretical perspectives in order to fill any perceived gaps in knowledge in the 
existing literature on Nigeria‘s military involvement in 
Liberia.sJEojgojggijefje9iawitoenhognzehatoh
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of study 
Several decades ago a former US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara did 
reveal that from the years 1955-1966, 87% of the world‘s very poor nations and 48% 
of the world‘s middle income nations (according to World Bank categorisation) 
suffered serious internal violence and conflicts; and from records available, he 
opined that economic underdevelopment is a major causative factor fueling crises 
and conflicts in the developing world (McNamara, 1966). The implication is that it is 
possible to predict the highest incidence of violence and conflict in the most poverty-
stricken countries of the World and these are, of course, found in the developing 
nations of the Third World including Liberia and Nigeria. Any exhibition of 
weakness, failure or inability by political leaders to prudently manage the human and 
material resources of the states (under the prevailing circumstances of evolving crisis 
and conflict) often, could lead to state abnormality or exhibition of symptoms of 
failure in the state. The four-decade period, especially in Africa, between 1960 and 
1999 was characterised mostly by numerous deadly international crises and conflicts, 
some of genocidal proportions, culminating in millions of deaths and 
refugees/internally-displaced persons (Adebajo, 2002). A critical observation does 
reveal that causative factors to these crises and conflicts bordered on unstable 
economies, bad leadership, fragile political institutions as well as rabid corrupt 
practices – all of which are negative functional indicators in governance and 
government. 
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In the same vein, another observer stated, saying that the West African sub-
region is ―the (sic) symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal 
stress, in   which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‗strategic‘ danger,‖ noting that 
it is ― home to some of the ‗unsafest‘ places in the world‖ (Kaplan, 1994: p. 44).  
 
Figure 1: Map showing location of Liberia and Nigeria in Africa. Retrieved March 12, 
2015 from http://www.freeusandworldmaps.com/html/WorldRegions/ 
WorldRegions.html 
 
 
To acknowledge the past of Liberia, is to acknowledge the history of the 
Trans-Atlantic slave trade. The geographic space known presently, as Liberia, in 
West Africa, as shown in Figure 1 was originally inhabited by peoples of different 
ethnicities. However, in the first decade of the nineteenth century (with slave trade, 
de facto and de jure abrogated), anti-slavery societies began to return freed slaves 
Nigeria Liberia 
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from North America and the West Indies (Maathai, 2009: p.5). In time, the 
descendants of these settlers formed a strong minority and became known as 
Americo-Liberians. The land on which this group settled was acquired by barter by 
the Americo-Liberians from the indigenous people of the area. Nonetheless, in 1847, 
the settlers declared independence while continuing the subjugation of the 
indigenous African people. However, as of the year 1990, when the Liberian civil 
war broke out, the entire population of both the descendents and the original settlers 
was about 2.5 million.  
Liberia has a total land area of  96, 320 square kilometres, maritime area of 
15, 050 square kilometres and a coastline of 579 kilometres (Retrieved January 28, 
2014 from www.issafrica.org/af/profiles/Liberia/LIBERIA1.HTML#geography_ 
Anchor). It is strategically situated on the coast of West Africa and is bound by Cote 
d‘Ivoire and Sierra Leone in the east and west respectively, Guinea to the north and 
the Atlantic Ocean to the south. Three major geographic regions delineate the 
country: a coastal belt of sandy beaches and lagoons, a plateau and a mountain region 
endowed with various minerals such as iron ore, gold, and diamonds. Its proximity to 
the ocean helps provide the water that supports the fertile soil and which in turn 
supports the subsistence agriculture of the peasant population. However, Liberia is 
largely known today because of its rich timber and vast rubber plantations. 
Up until the Nigerian-initiated-and-led Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) military intervention in Liberia in 
1990, her natural resources have not translated the country into any kind of serious 
economic or infra-structural development. English is the official language of Liberia 
but Bassa, Krahn and Kru are widely spoken. Liberia has a composition of ethnic 
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groups such as the Bassa, Vai, Mano, Mende, Belle, Dey, Gbande, Gio, Gda, Grebo, 
Kissi, Kpelle, Kru, Loma and Mandingo (Oni, 2002). 
Liberia‘s crises and conflict do not fit into the prototype of conflicts in Africa 
emanating from artificial geographic entities, called countries or nations, created by 
European colonists. However, Liberia experienced similar European attitude in terms 
of colonial exploitation. The multi-national organisation, Firestone Company, while 
decimating the timber and rubber in Liberia, did nothing to improve the lot of the 
exploited Liberians. Similarly, their actions of relating more with the minority 
Americo-Liberians widened the economic gap amongst the indigenous populations 
and thesettled Liberians and promoted inter-ethnic feud. Before long, disenchanted 
and disgruntled political elites began playing on ethnic and cultural sentiments on 
selfish political and pecuniary goals. Furthermore, these relatively modern political 
gamblers coercively began institutionalising themselves in power. The authoritarian 
and ruthless character of these political rulers, coupled with avarice and corruption, 
not only retrogressed their country, but also created opposition in the form of 
political parties, warlords, or incessant riots and demonstrations. More so, the 
disgruntled and dispossessed had an amalgam of jobless and hapless youths with 
which to build their ranks and engage in violence and war. Bangura (1997, pp 117- 
148), with reference to African countries, was of the opinion that the last decade of 
the last century, after the demise of the Cold War, witnessed more of intra-national 
conflicts than international wars; indicating that in the emergent scenario where 
ideological rivalry between the West and the East was no more prevalent, the 
proliferation of illegal small weapons across national borders precipitated a lot of 
wars. This development created a situation where civilians and non-conventional 
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military infrastructure were targeted resulting in mass civilian killings and 
displacements. 
In states endowed with vast valuable economic resources like gold, diamond 
and fossil fuel, competition for control of these resources became a do-or-die affair. 
Hence, what could have been a blessing for national development, became a major 
cause of conflict, fuelling wars. As posited by Bangura (1997), it was more or less a 
state of organised anarchy. In his words:  
Most wars of the 1990s have been fought within 
countries rather than, as was hitherto the case, 
between states; the narratives or doctrines of major 
world powers no longer define the ideologies and 
objectives of warring groups; small, highly mobile 
weapons, often supplied by illicit private dealers, 
seem to play a much longer role than heavy 
conventional weapons in fueling wars; combatants 
deliberately target civilians rather than armed 
opponents in prosecuting goals; and atrocities are 
freely committed as part of strategies aimed at 
publicising political statements. ... In countries that 
are rich in mineral resources, such as diamonds, 
gold, timber, agricultural produce, drug-generating 
plants and oil, the political goals of wars often 
interact with the multiple logics of resource 
appropriation, the drug trade, the looting of private 
property, and vandalism. Such complicated 
outcomes have led many commentators to portray 
contemporary wars as being basically anarchical 
(p.117). 
In Liberia, the story was not that different. The multi-ethnic composition of 
the country bred disgust amongst the ethnic groups. But it was the antagonism and 
discriminatory policies of the settler descendants, the Americo-Liberians, that created 
almost an apartheid system in the country. The settlers dominated all the political, 
social, and economic realms of government and the privileges. Political power and 
development was lopsided in the rural areas which was the economic mainstay 
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lacking in amenities, while the urban areas had the basic amenities. Such lopsided 
development, for the most part, led to urban drift with its own social problems. These 
problems became accentuated with unbridled corruption. It was one thing looting the 
treasury; it was another displaying the ill gotten wealth with reckless abandon. 
Because of corrupt practices, civil servants were mistrusted by the public which 
would go to any length to have them eliminated. 
What is more, the Liberian Armed Forces was anything but professional and 
national. Recruitment and training were ethnic/class-based and did not conform or 
represent the best practices in the military world. Citizens were arbitrarily picked up, 
beaten, women violated, properties looted and some killed. This created so many 
enemies that citizens joined the rebel forces to avenge the brutality of the Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL). It is no wonder then that the lives lost in the civil war 
ranged from 150,000 (Frontline World, May 2005. Retrieved August 29, 2015 from 
www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ stories/liberia/facts.html) to 250,000 (Liberian Country 
Profile Overview. Retrieved August 29, 2015 from www.bbc.com/ news/world-
africa13729504), from a population of over 2.3 million. 
However, the immediate causes of the civil war derive from the Rice riots of 
1979. William Tolbert, who replaced William Tubman as President, began the 
process of integrating Liberians in the political programme by allowing for political 
parties to be formed. One of such parties, comprising educated indigenous Liberians 
was the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL). It later changed its name to the 
United Peoples Party and began condemning government policies such as the 
increase in the price of imported rice. The widespread riots and the calls of 
resignation created a fertile ground for a coup. On the 12
th
 of April, 1980 a group of 
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non-commissioned soldiers, led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, assassinated 
William Tolbert, the President, and assumed power. 
Apart from the bloody nature of the coup, Doe and his supporters went on to 
confiscate properties of the Americo-Liberians and continued the corruption that was 
entrenched in the Liberian political system under the previous administrations. He 
went on to stifle opposition through killings and imprisonments. Before long, 
opposition to his administration began to swell. In 1983, an unsuccessful coup was 
attempted by the former Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia, 
Brigadier-General Thomas G. Quiwonkpa. His second attempt in 1985 was ill-fated. 
This time, however, he was captured and executed alongside his colleagues. At this 
point, the power play took on an ethnic dimension. The Krahn-dominated AFL (loyal 
to the President, Samuel Doe) went on rampage, killing Quiwonkpa‘s ethnic group 
members, the Gio and Mano in and around Monrovia and Nimba County. Master 
Sergeant Samuel Doe continued to overreach with his orgy of violence until Charles 
Taylor appeared on the scene in December 1989. 
Feeding on the disenchantment of the people, Charles Taylor, an Americo-
Liberian, organised the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to wade into the 
misgovernment and violence which President Doe and his supporters were meting 
out to Liberians. Supported by Franco-phone West African countries of Ivory Coast 
and Burkina Faso and with an army of 150 men, Charles Taylor invaded Liberia 
from Ivory Coast first landing in Nimba County. Nimba County was home to many 
Quiwonkpa‘s ethnic group members and had a significant number of anti-Doe 
supporters. Thus began the Liberian civil war (Oni, 2002).   
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Nigeria, on its part, is the most populated black country on earth with the 
largest standing army in West Africa in the 1990s (Military Balance, 1996/1997). 
The country had also been variously referred to as the ―giant of Africa‖, ―giant in the 
tropics‖, ―spokesman of the blacks all over the world‖, ―a frontline state in Africa‖, 
among others (Adelemo & Baba, 1993). As just one of the five Anglophone 
countries in the 15-member Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Nigeria‘s military power in the West Africa sub-region coupled with 
her dominant influence in the area, attracts scholarly interest. Perceived from a 
demographic prism, the country, as at 1997, hosted about half of the entire 
population of the West African sub-region (West Africa, June 1997: p.1038). With a 
total GDP then at 173.7 billion US dollars in relation to those of the entire West 
African sub-region estimated at about 374.927 US billion dollars, Nigeria held about 
46.33%. This made it, apparently, the largest economy in West Africa in the 1990s 
and the largest economy in Africa as at 2015. 
However, Nigeria‘s internal dynamics as at 1990 when it militarily intervened 
in Liberia, was not enviable, to say the least. The economy was shaky, there were 
coup attempts by army officers to topple the Nigerian military government, and the 
civil-military relations was not cordial as well. In addition, there was apparent 
complicity by some of the West African Franco-phone state in fueling the internal 
crisis in Liberia. It was in the midst and haze of these developments that Nigeria 
initiated and led a military intervention into Liberia, supposedly under ECOWAS 
mandate. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
In the conceptualisation, mobilisation and operations of ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which intervened militarily in the Liberian Civil War 
between 1990 and 1999, Nigeria contributed and lost most in terms of men, material 
and money (Omede, 2004). And even recently as at 2009, Nigeria has had 43 
peacekeeping missions and 17,000 military personnel across the world. This is a 
legacy inherited during the British colonial rule when the British colonial 
government used the mechanism of military intervention and coercion in both its 
foreign and domestic policies especially in Africa ( Lugard, 1965; Mbaeyi, 1978).          
Even though this was the case, there appeared to be no international consensus 
among ECOWAS member-states on intervening militarily in the Liberian Civil War. 
The ECOWAS regional organisation is made up of 15 member-states. Of this 
number, only four - Ghana, Gambia, Sierra-Leone (Anglophone) and Guinea 
(Francophone) joined Nigeria in the military intervention. 
The use of military power by Nigeria to intervene in the Liberian civil war 
was expected to win for her considerable material gain and respect necessary for 
establishing, projecting and enhancing her status and image in the comity of nations 
generally and in the West Africa sub-region in particular. Despite the huge human 
and material resources spent in Liberia by Nigeria, it is yet to be ascertained if the 
country went to Liberia ―to keep the peace‖ in its national interest, and whether the 
military involvement was multilaterally consensual. Furthermore, (and in contrast to 
the experience of some states such as United States, Britain, Russia, China among 
others which predicate their external military engagements to anticipated material 
gains) it remains to be seen if Nigeria achieved any material gains from the military 
involvement. What is known, acknowledged and assumed is the fact that Nigeria 
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went to Liberia to keep the peace supposedly in her national interest; but what is not 
known is if the military adventure was actually advantageous to Nigeria‘s national 
interest or not. This is the knowledge gap which this study wants to fill. In addition, a 
situation where some Nigeria‘s African neighbours in general and some in West 
Africa in particular perceive Nigeria‘s ―overwhelming military influence‖ and power 
in West Africa with great suspicion had always prevailed and apparently continues to 
prevail. Consequently the rationality of the entire military involvement by Nigeria in 
Liberia is called into question. This situation raises vital questions. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The essence of research question in this study is to unveil the dimensional 
thrusts of enquiry in establishing the hitherto unclarified issues surrounding Nigeria‘s 
military involvement in the Liberian civil war.  Two fundamental questions in this 
regard, have therefore, been identified namely: 
1. Was Nigeria‘s military involvement in the Liberian civil war between 1990 
and 1997 in her national interest? 
2. Was the involvement a consensual multilateral initiative by Nigeria, or was it 
a dangerous precedent in international relations? 
It is hoped that these questions will throw more light on the study. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Dovetailing from the research questions are the research objectives. These 
objectives are meant to determine the focus and trajectory of the study. As a result, 
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two objectives derived from the research questions, have also been identified. These 
are: 
1. To ascertain if Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia was in Nigeria‘s 
national interest. 
2. To clarify if the expedition was a consensual international initiative by 
Nigeria or if it was a dangerous precedent in international relations. 
 
The fundamental expectation in these objectives is that they will help in evolving a 
thesis for this study on Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia between 1990 – 
1997. 
1.5 Scope of Study 
I t is important at this point to indicate that the Liberian civil war had two 
segments namely – the first segment (1990 – 1997), and the second segment from 
1997 – 2003. The study period 1990 – 1997 commenced during the presidency of 
Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe and the rebellions of the opposition armed groups, the 
principal of which was Charles Taylor‘s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). 
This period witnessed Nigeria‘s overwhelming military involvement in Liberia, the 
fall of Doe‘s regime and the inauguration of Charles Taylor as the democratically 
elected President of Liberia by 1997. The period 1997 – 2003,   in the Liberian civil 
conflict, on the other hand, commenced with Taylor‘s ascendancy to power in 1997, 
and then a resumption of the second Liberian civil war which is outside the study 
period of this research. 
The reason for choosing 1990 – 1997 is that it was a period that witnessed the 
Nigeria-initiated-and-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia – a phenomenon that 
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revealed Nigeria‘s display of overwhelming military power and demagoguery under 
an assumed ECOWAS mandate. The perception in this study is that the internal 
dynamics of the 1990 – 1997 period in Nigeria were complex to the extent that an 
attempt to extend this study of Nigeria‘s involvement in Liberia outside the period of 
study, in detail, could result in, ―chasing many rabbits in the wild at the same time 
and ending up catching none‖, in words of a proverb. The thrust of this study, 
therefore, is to narrow the study area and do greater detailed in-depth study. This is 
what has informed the choice of 1990 – 1997 as the period of study. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The study is a qualitative research based on primary and secondary data.  
Primary data-gathering was carried out in Nigeria and it involved in-depth interviews 
with 10 principal respondents who were either policy makers or policy executors 
during Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia. The in-depth interviews, which 
were carried out on eight principal Nigerian military government officials during the 
country‘s military intervention in Liberia and two intergovernmental organisation 
(IGO) officials, were conducted from February until May 2014 as indicated in the 
following Table 1. 
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Table 1: List of Interviews and Respondents on Nigeria’s Military Involvement 
in Liberia 1990 – 1997 
 
Date 
Name of 
interviewee/ 
respondent 
Title or status of  interviewee/ 
respondent 
Place of interview Official of 
6th 
February 
2014 
Ogbole Amedu 
Ode. 
Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Nigeria. 
Office of the Spokesperson, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Federal Secretariat, Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
20th 
February 
2014 
Lieutenant-
General Salihu 
Ibrahim 
(Retired) 
Lieutenant-General (Retired) and former 
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Nigerian 
Army during the Military intervention. 
General Ibrahim Villa, Malali 
Estate, Kaduna, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
27th 
February 
2014 
Major E.M Jallo 
(Retired) 
Major (Retired) Sierra-Leone Army, 
Information Officer, Department of 
Peace Keeping, ECOWAS Commission. 
Office of the Directorate, 
Department of Peace 
Keeping, ECOWAS 
Commission Headquarters 
Abuja, Nigeria 
IGO 
28th 
February 
2014 
Major- General 
K.C Osuji 
Major-General; Former Staff Officer, 
ECOMOG Headquarters Liberia during 
the military intervention; Director of 
Administration, Defence Headquarters, 
Abuja Nigeria; and  presently the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1 
Division, Nigerian Army, Kaduna, 
Nigeria. 
Office of the Director, 
Directorate of 
Administration, Defence 
Headquarters, Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
7th March 
2014 
Major General 
Ishaya Bakut 
(Retired) 
Major General (Retired) and former 
ECOMOG Field Commander in Liberia 
during the military intervention. 
No. 25A, Suez Crescent, 
Ibrahim Abacha Estate, Wuse 
Zone 4, Abuja, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
14th March 
2014 
Major-General, 
(Dr). J. Shagaya 
PhD (Retired). 
Major-General (Retired) and former 
ECOMOG Field Commander during the 
intervention. 
General Shagaya Villa, 
Abuja, Nigeria Via electronic 
link at Major-General TL 
Ashei‘s House, No. 36 
Tafuki Road, Kabala West, 
Kaduna, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
27th March 
2014 
Brigadier-
General P.T. 
Boroh (Retired) 
Brigadier-General (Retired), Security 
and Defence Consultant, UN Office, 
Abuja, Nigeria. 
Selem Guest Inn, Maitama, 
Abuja, Nigeria 
IGO 
21st April 
2014 
Major-General 
C.C. Iweze 
(Retired) 
Major-General (Retired) and former 
Chief of Staff, ECOMOG Headquarters 
Liberia during the intervention. 
No. 1 Obudu Close, Osborne 
Foreshore Estate, Ikoyi, 
Lagos, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
19th May 
2014 
NAF Group-
Captain Isa Bala 
(Retired) 
Group-Captain (Retired) and former 
Assisntant Director of Operations, 
Nigerian Airforce during the military 
intervention. 
No. 12 Isa Bala Close, 
Kurmin-Mashi Quaters, 
Kaduna, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
24th May 
2014 
Major-General 
T.L. Ashei 
(Retired) 
Major-General (Retired); former 
Commandant, Nigerian Defence 
Academy and former Chief of 
Operations, Nigerian Army during the 
military Intervention in Liberia. 
No. 36 Tafuki Road, Kabala 
West, Kaduna, Nigeria. 
Nigerian 
Government 
 
The respondents in the interviews were chosen based on the researcher‘s 
knowledge of the principal policy makers and executors of government policy during 
the military intervention period. This is as a result of his being an academic staff of 
the Nigerian military organisation, the Nigerian Defence Academy. Another premise 
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for choosing the respondents is the snowball technique, in which selected principal 
respondents linked the researcher to another principal respondent. In this snowball 
technique, Respondent No.2 (a retired General who was the Chief of Staff, Nigerian 
Army during the Nigerian military intervention) linked the researcher up with 
Respondent No.8 – a retired Nigerian Army General who was the ECOMOG Chief 
of Staff in Liberia in the period under study. In the same snowball technique, 
Respondent No.10 (a retired General who was the Nigerian Army Chief of 
Operations during the Nigerian military intervention) referred the researcher to 
Respondent No.6 (a retired Nigerian Army General who was one of the ECOMOG 
Commanders in Liberia during Nigeria‘s military involvement there). 
All the respondents have Masters degrees or their equivalent qualifications 
from famous military institutions around the world. One of them, Respondent No.6, 
has a PhD degree, while Respondent 7 is a doctoral candidate in defence and security 
studies. Based on the aforementioned facts, the choice of respondents for the oral 
interview was made through a combination of the personal knowledge of the 
Nigerian dramatis personae in the Nigerian military involvement and the snowball 
technique. The choice of this combination of techniques is geared towards getting to 
the root of the dynamics of Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia with the 
ultimate aim of making an original contribution to knowledge in the study area. 
There were 19 basic interview questions which are germane to the study (Appendix 
1). 
These in-depth interview questions were framed for the purpose of answering 
the two research questions in the study area. Interview questions 1-7 were based on 
the respondents‘ demography which include name, age, highest education 
attainment, official ranks/designation while in service, tenure in office, participation 
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in the decision on Nigeria‘s military involvement as well as role in military 
operations during the intervention in Liberia. 
Interview questions 8-12 were based on policy operational aspects of 
Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia which includes the timing of the 
involvement, reasons for the intervention, how the decision for intervention was 
made, experience in military operations during the intervention (if a combat official), 
and Nigeria‘s casualty figures. Interview questions 13-19 relate to an assessment of 
the Nigerian military involvement in Liberia bordering on the necessity or otherwise 
of the intervention; whether it was in Nigeria‘s national interest, that is, whether 
Nigeria benefited from the involvement; and whether Nigeria‘s involvement was a 
consensual multilateral action or whether it was a dangerous precedent and whether 
there was a positive or negative effect of the military involvement. The issue of 
whether internal security threats contributed to the Liberian war and the subsequent 
Nigerian involvement; and also whether Nigeria‘s military involvement minimised or 
exacerbated such internal security threats in Liberia and Nigeria are also contained in 
this assessment group of interview questions. 
All the assessment interview questions are related and connected. However, 
Question 14 ( Appendix 1), emphatically, demands an answer on whether Nigeria‘s 
military involvement was in her national interest or not. Interview Question 16  
(Appendix1), in a similar vein, is to find out if the military intervention was a 
commendable consensual multilateral act or if it was a dangerous precedent. The 
interview questions were specifically framed as aforementioned in order to solicit for 
an answer to the two research questions with a view to fulfilling the two main 
objectives of the study. 
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Apart from primary data, secondary data gathered for this research include  
book and journal articles, seminar papers, monographs, newspaper articles as well as 
website articles from USM subscribed data bases such as JSTOR, EBSCOHOST, 
Scopus, among others. The primary data (in-depth interview responses), through 
sorting and coding, and also the secondary data, through content analysis, are 
conceptualised, using the theory of realism, as explained in Chapter 3 of this study 
which deals with the theoretical framework. The data are interpreted with a view of 
answering the three research questions in the study. 
On the other hand, documented speeches, policy statements and government 
reports which include: Obasanjo, O. (1999), Post-Inauguration speech at the UN 
General Assembly session, New York; Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) Final Report, June 2009; and  Babangida, I.B. (1990) The 
imperative features of Nigerian foreign policy and the crisis in Liberia, Contact, 2 
(3), were obtained from the Nigerian Defence Academy, the Nigerian Armed Forces 
Command And Staff College, and the Nigerian National Defence College libraries, 
as well as the personal collections of the researcher. 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
A limitation of this study is that it is only a qualitative research based on 
content analysis of the dynamics of Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia from 
1990-1997 using the realist theory. The study is not a quantitative study involving 
mathematical models as obtains in systems and game theories. Perhaps, further 
studies based on other theoretical perspectives could compliment this realist study on 
Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia. Another constraint/limitation of this study 
is the reluctance by some serving officers of the Nigerian military who served in 
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Liberia during the civil war to disclose classified but vital information on Nigeria‘s 
military involvement in the Liberian civil war. In spite of this, efforts were made to 
interview and extract information from the key knowledgeable personnel who were 
willing to respond to the oral interviews.  
1.8 Significance of the Study 
The study is anticipated to be significant as it is an assessment study of 
Nigeria‘s use of military power in Liberia‘s civil war, considering, among other 
things, hitherto neglected NTS threats which partly contributed to the outbreak of the 
Liberian civil war. Based on the existing literature, it appears that emphases have not 
been laid on in-depth study, using in-depth interview as methodology, with regards 
to the use of military power by Nigeria in her involvement in Liberia from 1990 to 
1997. This can be seen in the works of many scholars like Pitt (1999), Tuck (2000), 
Rizvanovic (2013), Ero (1995), Fawole (2001), Alli (2012), Rahman (2001), Paris 
(2001), Oni (2002), Adebajo (2002), Kieh (2009), Arowolo (2010), Gbor (2004), 
Omede (2004) and Afaha (2013).  
Implied in the above observation is the fact that, hitherto, there is an apparent 
lacuna of in-depth study based on oral interviews and responses from the relevant 
dramatis personae in the Nigerian military expedition in Liberia, incorporating the 
expedition‘s impact on Nigeria‘s national interest, and its multilateral consensuality. 
This is the reason why this study, incorporating responses from in-depth interviews 
of policy makers and practitioners in Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia, is 
important and significant. It is expected that findings from this study will make an 
original contribution not only to the prevailing knowledge of Nigeria‘s involvement 
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in the Liberian civil war, but also to the principle and practice of rational use of 
military power by states in international relations. 
It is anticipated also that the suggestions and recommendations in this study 
will also be of immense benefit to research institutes, universities, policy makers in 
civil and military government departments within and outside Nigeria, as well as the 
general public.  
1.9 Chapterisation 
The research outlay of this study is as follows: Chapter 1 embodies a general 
introduction of the study, highlighting the geographical and historical backgrounds of 
Liberia and Nigeria; with emphasis on the socio-economic developments that led to 
the Liberian civil war which prompted Nigeria‘s military involvement. The chapter 
also highlights the problem statement of the study, the research questions, research 
objectives, scope of study, the research methodology, limitations of the study as well 
as the significance of the study. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review which highlights the extant literature 
in the study area and the perceived knowledge gaps that need to be filled therein. It 
discusses the opinions of relevant scholars who have written on Nigeria‘s military 
involvement in Liberia in books, journals and other print and electronic media; and 
ends up revealing the gap that needs to be filled in the area of the study. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework of the study, which is the 
realist theory. Two broad approaches in international relations, namely – the classical 
approach and the critical approach, are examined. The chapter examines these 
approaches, bearing in mind the philosophical roots, assumptions and criticisms 
 19 
 
against the classical and critical theories. It also compares and contrasts these 
theories and ends up stating why realism theory was chosen for the study. 
Chapters 4 and 5 (with differently itemised sub-themes) highlight the 
discussions and findings of the study, taking into considerations the two research 
objectives, namely – first, to find out if Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia was 
in her national interest or not; and, second, to ascertain if the intervention was a 
commendable consensual multilateral action or if it was a dangerous precedent in 
international relations. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusive part of the study. It presents a synopsis of the 
entire study, highlighting the research objectives, the discussions and the findings. 
Based on the aforementioned highlights, it also, presents a thesis which forms the 
conclusion. A brief recommendation is also made in this conclusive chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Military interventions in international peace support operations (PSOs) 
generally derive their legitimacy and legality from Article 42 of the UN Charter 
which states that the Security Council of the UN ―may take such action by air, sea or 
land as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Such actions may include demonstration, blockade and other operations by air, sea or 
land forces of members of the UN‖. In fact, the UN Security Council, acting under 
Article 39 of its charter can intervene in any member state‘s territory to restore 
internal peace and order if necessary by military force as soon as there is credible 
threat to peace. 
Since the end of the first Liberian civil war in the late 1990s, there has been 
proliferation of literature on Nigeria‘s military involvement in the West African 
state. Most of these works of literature emphasise the narratives of either the modus 
operandi or the international efforts made to stop the war or the specific legal 
instruments aimed at stopping the war, among other things. Little or not much 
attention has been devoted to finding out the actual intent of Nigeria‘s military 
involvement between 1990 and 1997. Ideas and arguments have also been put 
forward in the extant literature on Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia between 
1990 and 1997. One group of scholars claimed that the military intervention was, ab-
initio, controversial. Pitt (1999) posited that the world community, apparently, 
adopted a zero response approach to Liberia despite the grave genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity carried out by the belligerent factions in the civil war; 
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saying that the Nigerian Army-led ECOMOG was therefore formed to address the 
conflict. He further observed that even though critics and pessimists perceive the 
intervention in Liberia as of limited effectiveness, it portrays an African solution to 
an African problem. However, the analyst posited further that the Nigerian-led 
military intervention was a colossal failure maintaining that the Nigerian-initiated-
and-led ECOMOG military involvement in Liberia did not have majority support and 
authorisation from among the West African states (Pitt, 1999). In Pitt‘s opinion, 
Nigerian troops dominated the ECOMOG force thereby, making the military 
intervention controversial and unsuccessful. 
Put differently, internal differences and disagreements among ECOWAS 
member states triggered off what could be termed a Nigerian-led Coalition of the 
Willing and Able (COWA). According to Pitt, Nigerian troops accounted for about 
70% of the ECOMOG force. This was why the NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, 
perceived the Nigeria Army-led ECOMOG military intervention in Liberia as an 
exercise in Nigerian hegemony. The observer noted, finally, that by giving room for 
Nigeria‘s prejudice to influence the policy of military intervention in Liberia, the 
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) created an obstacle to the overall success of 
the operation.  
Referring comically to the Nigerian Army-led ECOMOG acronym as Every 
Car Or Moving Object Gone (in apparent indication of the alleged looting excesses 
committed by some ECOMOG soldiers in Monrovia during the Nigerian-led military 
intervention), Christopher Tuck (2000), with reference to the Liberian civil war, 
declared: 
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From the beginning of the war in 1989, to its 
formal conclusion in 1997, 200,000 died and 1.2 
million were displaced out of a population of only 
2.5 million….The conflict itself exhibited all the 
manifestations of post-Cold War intra-state 
conflict: state collapse, ethnic conflict, political 
fragmentation, warlordism and a late and 
inadequate response from the United Nations 
(Tuck; 2000: p.1). 
Right from the onset, there appeared, in Tuck‘s view, to have been ambiguity 
in the Nigerian-led ECOMOG mandate to keep the peace or to enforce peace. This is 
evident in the disparate assertions by both the first ECOMOG Commander, General 
Arnold Quainoo of Ghana, and President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria. According 
to Arnold Quainoo, ―The military situation is such that my forces now have no 
choice but to mount a limited offensive in order to protect their positions... and 
enforce a ceasefire‖ (p.6). A critical look at the statement shows a contrast between 
the  Nigerian President‘s statement that ―ECOMOG is a peace force…. Our mission 
there is clear, precise and attainable…. ECOMOG forces are soldiers without 
enemies or favoured faction in the conflicts; they can open fire only in self defence‖ 
(p.6). The ambiguity of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG was further highlighted when 
Tuck declared:  
Even at its inception, ECOMOG was 
controversial…. The clearest problem resulted 
from the clash between the interest of Nigeria and 
those of other West African states, notably Cote 
D‘Ivoire…. There existed considerable resentment 
of Nigeria‘s rather heavy-handed use of its 
influence…. ECOMOG is nothing but a 
convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian 
war machine (p.5). 
Concluding, Tuck noted that there has been a geometric rise in intra-state 
conflicts with humanitarian disasters and insecurity in the West Africa sub-region as 
consequences. In his opinion, the Nigerian Army-led ECOMOG military 
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involvement in Liberia has neither provided solution to peacekeeping problems or 
even identified or dealt with the conflict causative factors or conflictogens fueling 
conflicts in Liberia and elsewhere. 
Another famous scholar who wrote extensively on Nigeria‘s military 
intervention in Liberia is Adekeye Adebajo. In his 2002 publication, he highlighted 
six main causative factors in the war namely: the exclusionary rule of the Liberian 
oligarchy; the brutal and inept rule of the Liberian President Master-Sergeant Samuel 
Doe; the deleterious effect which Doe‘s rule had on the Armed Forces of Liberia; the 
ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from this rule; the sub-regional 
tensions and rivalries that resulted from Samuel Doe‘s bloody rise to power, and the 
destabilising effect of the sudden withdrawal of U.S. support for Doe who was a 
strategic Cold War ally of the United States. Linking the conflicts and wars in 
Liberia and elsewhere to internal negative factors, Adebajo posited that, 
Between 1960 and 1990, eighteen civil wars in 
Africa resulted in about 7 million deaths, and 
spawned 5 million refugees…. Their roots were 
internal: inept political leadership that manipulated 
ethnicity to favour or suppress particular groups; 
…. Weak and unproductive economies; inefficient 
bureaucracies and fragile political authority (p.1). 
Exposing the strategic flaws in the ECOMOG operations led by Nigeria, 
Adebajo quoted the then ECOMOG Chief of Staff, General Cyril Iweze as saying 
that even simple ―Military maps were not available except the tourist maps of 
Monrovia which was (sic) what the initial planning was based on‖ (p.17). He 
conclusively asserted that between 1993 and1994, Nigeria‘s military intervention in 
Liberia was termed ―waging war to keep peace‖ (p.117).   
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Linking the Liberian Civil War and the subsequent Nigerian military 
intervention to the failure of successive Liberian governments to cater for the 
majority of its citizens, George Kieh was of the opinion that the first Liberian civil 
war of 1990-1997 was precipitated by the failure of the Liberian nation to meet the 
expectations of most Liberians who were from the indigenous tribes since 1847 when 
the country adopted its constitution after declaring independence from the American 
Colonisation Society (ACS). Added to this fact was that the major indigenous ethnic 
group members were not only marginalised in the societal scheme of things, they 
were also forced to pay taxes and also to perform menial jobs by the dominant 
minority Americo-Liberians (Kieh, 2009). 
In the view of Kieh, resultant class stratification, subsequently, emerged from 
political economic and social inequalities and inequities between the dominant  
group - the Americo-Liberians and the dominated indigenous class. Based on 
available data, he revealed that a micro-minority of about 5% of the Liberian 
population, the Americo-Liberians, controlled about 68% of the entire national 
income of Liberia and also about 70% of the national wealth of the country. In such a 
fragile state, already paralysed by the symptoms of abnormality, the subsisting 
government at the time, fell prey to armed insurrection which plunged Liberia into a 
very bloody civil war (Kieh, 2009). 
In Nigeria‘s military involvement in the Liberian crisis, ideology and power 
factors seem to have had much influence because of the absence of a rational 
position to explain the huge human, material and financial expenditure and losses 
incurred when weighed against Nigeria‘s national interest. In the view of Dare 
Arowolo, power and ideology, instead of rationality, determined the cause and the 
course of Nigeria‘s military involvement in Liberia (Arowolo, 2010). In his post-
